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In the new Keynesian model of endogenous stabilization governments have objectives with
respect to macroeconomic performance, but are constrained by an augmented Phillips curve.
Because they react more quickly to inflation shocks than private agents, governments can lean
against the macroeconomic wind. We develop an econometric test of this characterization of
the political-economic equilibrium. Applying this methodology to a variety of quadratic social
welfare functions provides inferences about the functional form of stabilization preferences
and about the formation of expectations.
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I. Introduction
A number of plausible assumptions are consistent with an endogenous stabilization
model.1 One of these relates to the functional form of the government’s objective
function; using US and OECD series on inflation and growth we compare eight
quadratic forms. Although identification issues arise and some statistical ambiguity
remains, our preferred form (circular indifference curves with an inflation policy
target) has a significantly better statistical fit than the agnostic vector autoregression
benchmark.
Because expected inflation enters the analysis as a shift parameter for the
augmented Phillips curve, another modeling assumption concerns the formation
of inflation forecasts by economic agents. We develop theoretical solutions and
econometric specifications for two possibilities: strongly rational and simple
* Economics Department, 1645 Campus Center Dr., Room 308, Salt Lake City, UT 84112,
phone: (801) 581-7481, fax: (801) 585-5946, email: kiefer@economics.utah.edu. I am grateful
to Jorge Streb and two anonymous referees for insightful comments.
1 Another name is political business cycle theory. The original insight for this literature dates
to Kalecki (1943); also see Nordhaus (1975) or Hibbs (1977). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 120
adaptive expectations. Rationality is the overwhelming assumption of the economics
literature because it coheres with the notion on well-informed maximizing agents.
We find, however, that its implications do not conform well to observed outcomes
when applied to endogenous stabilization; an adaptive model fits the data better.
The adaptive rule, often labeled naïve, could be the rational strategy in an uncertain
world.
II. Economic structure and objectives
The literature on political macroeconomics invariably invokes an augmented Phillips
curve as a structural constraint on policymakers.2 Conventionally this is an inverse
relation between the unexpected inflation and the gap between actual and natural
unemployment. Since the labor and product markets are linked, the natural output
*
t Y is conceptually equivalent to the natural rate of unemployment. We substitute
the output gap, defined as  () ()
* ln ln t t t Y Y y - = for the unemployment gap as the
measure of macroeconomic disequilibrium in our Phillips curve,3
, t t
e
t t y e y p p + + =                                                                                                       (1)
where  t p is the inflation rate and  t e defines a random inflation shock. Expected
inflation is  ,
e
t p is the inflation rate and  t e defines a random inflation shock.
Expected inflation is  ,
e
t p the forecast of a typical agent based on information
available in the previous period. Assuming expectations are fulfilled in the long
run, this relation rules out any long-run deviation from y = 0. However, as long as
economic agents do not fully anticipate the effects of fiscal, monetary and other
policies, governments are able to temporarily increase output at the cost of more
rapid inflation.
Another essential element is an assumption about political objectives. One
possibility is to suppose that the government’s goals are given by a quadratic
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where the growth rate of real output is  () ( ) , ln ln 1 - - = t t t Y Y g and
( ) ( )
*
1
* * ln ln - - = t t t Y Y g  is the natural rate of growth.
2 See, for example, Nordhaus (1975), Barro and Gordon (1983) or Alesina (1987).
3 The name of this equation derives from Phillips’ (1958) study of the inverse relation between
the unemployment rate and the wage inflation rate. Later Friedman (1968)  reformulated the
relation in terms of price inflation and added expected inflation.121 REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
The modeling of collective objectives is controversial. Textbooks often define
social welfare as an aggregation of individual preferences. Governmental targets
may reflect a weighted average of citizen preferences, with heavier weights assigned
to the ruling party’s core constituents. Differing targets for inflation could account
for ideological differences. It is also possible that the governments in all countries
share the same target. In the regression models below we incorporate this heroic
assumption as a first approximation. Functions such as (2) have been called
“abbreviated social welfare functions” because they are written in terms of economic
indicators such as inflation rather than citizen preferences; see Lambert (1993).
Quadratic forms are tractable because they always result in linear solutions. Within
the quadratic family, a variety of alternatives are plausible. Equation (2) has circular
indifference curves, but these can be made elliptical by adding a parameter to
reflect the relative weight of inflation versus growth goals. Some models allow
parabolic indifference curves. Sometimes the growth target differs from the natural
rate. Another alternative asserts that goals are specified in terms of output levels,
rather than growth rates. Objectives might also include the discounted value of
expected future outcomes. The government might plan for its current term of office
only, or it might plan to be in office for several terms, discounting the future
according to the probability of holding office. Alternatively, it might weigh
preelection years more heavily. Here we assume that only current conditions matter.4
Beginning with (2), this paper examines the statistical performance of some of
these possibilities.
III. Endogenous stabilization under circular objectives with an
inflation target
The government has limited options in a new Keynesian model of activist
stabilization. It is assumed that the government can exploit information and
implementation advantages to lean against the macroeconomic wind, although its
goals  ) ˆ and (
* p p = = t t t g g  may be unattainable.5 The government uses up-todate
information to guide policy, observing shocks and setting inflation accordingly. It
has an information advantage over agents, who forecast inflation in the previous
period. Rational agents come to understand that a policy of   0 ˆ > p  implies inflation;
4 See Kiefer (2000) for empirical evidence that only current conditions matter in political
business cycle econometrics.
5 Fischer (1977) is an early example in this literature. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 122
this expectation is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The stylized fact of inflation is consistent
with the hypothesis that governments target inflation.6
The long-run equilibrium is disturbed by exogenous shocks. To derive the




1 t t t t g y y g + - º - ( ) .
*
1 t t t t
e
t t g y g e y p p + - + + = -
























































p e p y
+
- + -







y g g                  (3)
Among other things, this implies that inflation and growth depend on conditions
inherited from the past, expectations and policy targets. We assume that the
government can implement its preferred policy through various policy instruments,
and that the various government agencies (central banks and treasuries) pursue
this common policy.
In the absence of shocks or uncertainty, the time-consistent equilibrium inflation
rate should occur where inflation is just high enough so that the government is not
tempted to spring a policy surprise. This equilibrium is the natural output, natural
growth and an ideologically determined rate of inflation,
Ideally a rational agent uses available information to forecast inflation. The
typical agent knows what the inflation target is; she also knows the slope of the
Phillips curve, the long-run growth trend and the pre-existing economic condition.
. ˆ , , 0
* p p = = = g g y
6 Barro and Gordon (1983) originally identified this inflationary bias. Their paper invokes a
slightly different objective function based on unemployment and inflation, with an
unemployment target below the natural rate. An inflation bias can result from either the
unemployment or the inflation target.
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However, we suppose that she cannot predict the next inflation shock et. Her
information set is  { } 1
* , , , ˆ - = t t y g I y p  This assumption about forecaster
sophistication is strong. To obtain the rational expectation of p given I, we take the
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so that expectations are given by the government’s inflation target with a correction
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A weak alternative is that inflation expectations are simply observed inflation
in the previous year ,  , 1 - = t
e
t p p  which we substitute into (3) as a regression
specification. Commonly referred to as the adaptive expectations model, it assumes
that agents are quick learners, but forgetful. Although many economists view the
adaptive model with suspicion because such forecasts can be irrational, adaptive
behavior may often be found. This simple forecasting rule has the desirable property
that it too can converge to the time-consistent equilibrium. For this reason we
characterize the adaptive model as weakly rational.7
IV. Other functional forms
A. Elliptical objectives
In light of the formal adoption of inflation targeting at a number of central banks,
including  the  new  European  Central  Bank,  we  consider  a modification to our
7 Before elections the situation can be less certain. Then, a sophisticated agent takes into
account her opinion about the outcome of the upcoming election. Invoking rational expectations
under these conditions, expected inflation equals a weighted average of partisan targets, with
the appropriate weights being the agent’s prediction of which party will hold power during the
next period, see Alesina (1987). Furthermore, in many countries early elections can be called
at any time. Under these constitutions every year is potentially an election year, and there is
always a positive probability of government change. Here we ignore these complications in
order to concentrate on the functional form of the government’s objective.
,
. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 124
restrictive assumption that equal deviations from natural growth and the target
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where the strength of inflation targeting is parameterized by the magnitude of l.8
Another reason for considering the elliptical form is the literature on the advantage
of a conservative central banker, originating with Rogoff (1985). Often this type of
conservatism is modeled in terms of the l weight.9
Certainly the assumption that l=1 is restrictive; perhaps we can settle this
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Comparing the circular solution with this one, and relabeling the circular model












Since this is only true in the trivial case that l = 1, (7) is identified with respect to
(3).
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8 Alesina’s (1988) objective function generalizes (6) by allowing growth targets other than the
natural rate and by including future inflation and growth.
9 A similar advantage also results from a policymaker who is conservative in the sense that her
target is closer to zero than that of the public; see Kiefer (2004).
,  (6)
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B. Growth targets
There are other plausible objective functions; below we survey a variety of quadratic
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where  g ˆ is the government’s preferred rate of growth. While (2) could be motivated
by seigniorage, this form may be interpreted as compensation for labor market or
tax imperfections, or it may be that governments prefer high growth for ideological
reasons. It is possible that governments and voters target growth rates in excess
of the natural growth rate, even when this is logically unsustainable.
Governmental options are still limited by the Phillips curve (1), and the economic-
political equilibrium is still disturbed by exogenous shocks. As before we derive
the government’s policy by using the Phillips curve to substitute for gt in the
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In the absence of shocks and uncertain government changes, the time-
consistent equilibrium is the natural output, natural growth and an ideologically
determined rate of inflation,
An identification problem arises again in the comparison of inflation and growth
targets forms. Whenever ( ) , ˆ ˆ * p y = - t g g the solution (3) is indistinguishable from
(10). However, notice that the growth target version implies a variable equilibrium
(to the extent that  *
t g evolves over time), while the inflation target version assumes
a fixed equilibrium. Thus, the two models do differ slightly, but, as empirical results
below confirm, this slight difference may be insufficient to distinguish between
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C. GDP gap targets
Next we consider a related form parameterized on income levels rather than growth
rates,
If voters are concerned about the income level rather than its growth rate, this
is arguably the better form. Deriving the government’s policy as before we find
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In the absence of shocks, the time consistent equilibrium is unchanged,
. ˆ , , 0
* p p = = = g g y
Now the rational inflation expectation is  . ˆ p p =
e
t Substituting this expression
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The time-consistent equilibrium is unchanged, as is the rational expectation.
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D. Parabolic objectives
Another alternative quadratic form is a parabolic function,
() . ˆ
2 p p - - = t i tg U
A conceptual shortcoming of the quadratic form is its satiation with respect to
growth. The parabolic form seems more plausible because it holds that governments




















t t t y g g
10 For example, see Clarida et al. (1999).
11 For example, see Alesina (1987). Nordhaus (1975) considers a parabolic function with
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This solution implies that inflation depends only on the inflation target and the
slope of the Phillips curve, while growth depends on expectations, lagged output
and policy targets.
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The parabolic function can also be generalized with a policy weight on inflation
analogous to the elliptical forms.12
() . ˆ
2 p p l - - = t i tg U
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Unfortunately the difference between the simple model and its policy-weighted
generalization cannot be identified for either the adaptive and rational cases.
Labeling the unweighted parameters with a tilde, it can be seen that the two
parabolic models are indistinguishable whenever
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V. Econometric specification and data
Although we may be unable to establish empirically a single most valid model, we
nevertheless attempt to narrow the field by fitting the inflation and growth
regressions implied by these eight objective functions and both expectations
models. Each model can be written as a two-equation reduced form for inflation
and growth with four predetermined variables (natural growth, expected inflation,
lagged output gap, and inflation shock) of the form:
( ) , , , ,
*
1 t t t t
e
t t e g y p e p P p + = - ( ) , , , ,
*
1 gt t t t
e
t t e g y G g + = - e p
where the functions P and G are given by the various theoretical solutions: (3), (7),
(10), (13), (16), (19), (22) and (25). These models are linear in variables but nonlinear
in their coefficients. Each model in Tables 2, 3 and 5 is identified by its assumed
social welfare equation number.
Our basic data are derived from the Penn World Table (PWT6.1), which includes
internationally comparable time series on the national accounts for almost all the
countries in the world for 1950-2000. Percentage growth is measured as the log
difference in real GDP per capita; for details on variable construction see Table 1.
Although it is customary to study stabilization outcomes with aggregate statistics,
such analysis is equally appropriate with per capita data. The difference is that
aggregate growth rates include population growth. Since population growth
changes slowly, it has little effect on short-run stabilization.
The inflation rate is defined using the purchasing power parity and GDP
estimates from the PWT. In Table 1 the numerator of the implicit deflator is GDP per
capita measured in current local currency, and the denominator is the same quantity
measured in real terms (1996 local currency units). As an example Figure 1 compares
this measure of inflation to official US statistics. It is clear that they are quite close
and that the PWT measure can be interpreted as an implicit deflator rate, and is an
appropriate indicator of macrostabilization.
Our models call for measures of macroeconomic disequilibrium and the
underlying output trend. The published series include only real output per capita,
and not its natural level. We estimate a smoothly evolving trend in potential output
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Table 1. Variable definitions
Symbol Definitions using PWT 6.1 variable names
Real GDP per capita it Y RGDPCHit
Natural real GDP per capita *
it Y  estimated by cubic smoothing
Growth rate it g () ( ) 1 ln ln - - it it RGDPCH RGDPCH

















-1 ln ln it it p p
one cubic regression for each country. The predicted values from these regressions
are used to estimate Y* according to:
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We use the results to construct the required series, the output gap y and the
trend growth rate g*. This method makes the convenient assumption that
macroequilibrium was achieved in the first year of observation; it also implies
macroequilibrium for the last observation. Since neither assumption can be justified,
we delete the first two and last two observations for each country from the dataset.
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inflation rate (%)
implicit GDP deflator (PWT)
implicit GDP deflator (BEA)
consumer price index (BLS)
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There are other smoothing methods. Gordon (1999) estimates the output gap
by picking a list of benchmark dates when he judges that the US economy
approximated macroequilibrium, and estimates the natural growth rate between
these dates as constant. His benchmark dates are: 1949Q1, 1954Q1, 1957Q3, 1963Q3,
1970Q2, 1974Q2, 1979Q3 1987Q3, 1990Q4, and 1995Q1. Figure 2 compares our
estimated natural growth with Gordon’s. To make the series comparable, we convert
Gordon’s aggregate statistics to a per capita basis by subtracting US population
growth (according to PWT). By definition the natural level changes over time as
technology advances and as capital is accumulated. Assuming that these influences
evolve slowly, natural output should also. Thus, it seems inconsistent that Gordon’s
natural growth is discontinuous at benchmark dates. However, we do not find
much difference between these two estimates for the US. Either method illustrates
the fact that the underlying growth rate of the US economy has changed over time.
Clearly, our methodology yields smoother changes in the natural growth, showing
a slight slowing of growth for the US from the 1960s through the 1980s, with
acceleration in the 1990s.13 Both methods give quite similar estimates of natural
trend and the output gap for the US.
13 The bumpy appearance of Gordon’s estimate is in part explained by subtraction of population
growth. Although population growth should be quite smooth itself, the PWT reports anomalous
population jumps in 1953 and 1958.
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Measuring the conceptual shock variable accurately is problematic. There are
many potentially important types of shocks to consider, and different countries
may experience different impacts. Here we use only an energy cost shock, the
difference between the US inflation rates of the CPI and of the CPI less energy,
hoping that the US experience reflects that of other countries. Clearly, this indicator
under-measures the energy shock in 1974-5 due to US price controls; see Figure 3.
We model the inflation shock as proportional to this indicator.
VI. An empirical comparison of modeling assumptions
The goodness-of-fit statistics in Tables 2 and 3 are the basis for our inferences
about social welfare functions. Comparing system likelihood statistics is appropriate
when then number of observations is the same, as they are for both the US and
OECD samples. This is less ambiguous than a comparison of the two R2 statistics,
one for the inflation regression and one for growth.14
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares results for the United States, covering
1958-1998. Table  3  repeats  the same regressions on an expanded database of 18
energy price shock (%)
14 There is R 2 ambiguity between models (a) and (c) in Table 4.133 REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
Table 3. System log likelihood statistics: OECD 1958-1998
Expectation assumption                          Adaptive                                      Rational
Error structure Spherical AR(1) Spherical AR(1)
VAR(1) benchmark -3291.1 -3286.1 -3291.1 -3286.1
Circular inflation target (2) -3267.5 -3166.8 -3872.4 -3155.2
Elliptical inflation target (6) -3266.8 3141.3 -3872.4 -3155.2
Circular growth target (9) -3363.6 -3167.8 -3878.5 -3156.1
Elliptical growth target (12) -3363.6 -3142.7 -3878.5 -3156.1
Circular output target (15) -3606.1 -3234.7 -3886.9 -3240.6
Elliptical output target (18) -3565.9 -3234.2 -3886.9 -3240.6
Parabolic (21) -3897.1 -3234.2 -3904.9 -3313.4
Weighted parabolic (24) -3897.1 -3234.2 -3904.9 -3240.6
Note: 704 observations.
Table 2. System log likelihood statistics: United States 1958-1998
Expectation assumption                         Adaptive                                       Rational
Error structure Spherical AR(1) Spherical AR(1)
VAR(1) benchmark -161.0 -160.2 -161.0 -160.2
Circular inflation target (2) -152.1 -148.7 -184.8 -152.4
Elliptical inflation target (6) -150.7 -148.6 -184.8 -152.4
Circular growth target (9) -153.4 -148.6 -184.4 -152.3
Elliptical growth target (12) -151.5 -148.3 -184.4 -152.3
Circular output target (15) -171.9 -160.4 -189.8 -161.1
Elliptical output target (18) divergent -159.2 -189.8 -161.1
Parabolic (21) -191.6 -159.2 -193.3 -165.8
Weighted parabolic (24) -191.6 -159.2 -193.3 -161.6
Note: 41 observations.
OECD countries, the same countries included in the Alesina and Roubini (1992)
study of political business cycles. 15 As a comparison of alternative models of
expectation formation, we first assume adaptive, or weakly rational, expectations.
15 They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (only
after reunification), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom and United States. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 134
For example, replacing  e
t p by  1 - t p in (3) gives the specification for the circular
inflation target model under adaptive expectations. This adds lagged inflation as
an exogenous variable. And second, we invoke the strongly rational expectations.
For example, using (5) gives the circular inflation target model under rational
expectations.
The first row of numbers reports a VAR(1) benchmark model. This is a two-
equation linear system in inflation and growth, including only the endogenous
variables lagged one year as regressors. Sims (1980) recommends this specification
as superior to structural models such as those developed here in light of uncertainty
about the true nature of political economy. Although his concern about structural
uncertainty is also relevant to uncertainty about social welfare functions, our goal
is to reduce theoretical uncertainty by considering a range of plausible functions.
The VAR(1) is a naïve benchmark against which we measure the fit of more
complicated hypotheses.
An examination of the residuals of these estimates suggests that the assumption
in (28) of well-behaved errors is invalid. Although autocorrelation corrections are
standard, we are reluctant to add additional structure to account for the
autocorrelation because this is not part of our theoretical development.
Nevertheless we add a minimum model of AR(1) errors as
. , , 1 g i u e e it it it p r = + = -                                                                                               (31)
The same autocorrelation parameter generates both inflation and growth errors,
and the errors uit are well behaved.16 We estimate this complication by substituting
this equation into (28) and rearranging as
() ( ) , , , , , , ,
*
1 2 1 1
*
1 1 t t t t
e
t t t t
e
t t t u g y g y p e p P r e p P rp p + - + = - - - - - -
Clearly, the AR(1) version adds considerable dynamic complexity that is not
part of our choice-theoretic explanation. Both the spherical error and AR(1) error
models are estimated on the same data to insure comparability.
Judging by the likelihood statistics, the adaptive expectations model fits the
data  better  than  the  rational  version;  in  the  absence  of  the  autocorrelation
16 Experiments with different autocorrelation parameters for inflation and growth reveal that
the difference between these parameters is usually insignificant.
  (32)
() ( ) . , , , , , ,
*
1 2 1 1
*
1 1 t g t t t
e
t t t t
e
t t t u g y G g y G g g + - + = - - - - - - e p r e p r   (33)135 REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
correction, only adaptive versions exceed the VAR(1) benchmark. This result
suggests that economic agents are not nearly as sophisticated as the strongly
rational model assumes. However, with the autocorrelation correction, both adaptiv
and rational versions exceed the benchmark. We might take the view that here is
some support for the rational hypothesis; or we might take the view that such
pragmatic error modeling can make even an inadequate model fit the data well.
Table 4 presents detailed results for eight of the more likely alternatives (shaded
in Tables 2 and 3). The R2 statistics imply that all these models predict inflation
more accurately than growth and that most of improvement due to the
autocorrelation correction occurs in the growth equation. In all of these models
the estimated slope of the Phillips curve is positive, as expected, and statistically
significant, although its magnitude varies markedly depending on whether we
correct for autocorrelation. These results imply considerable uncertainty about
the slope of the Phillips curve; our estimate under the spherical error assumption
is quite flat, but quite steep under AR(1) errors. Possibly the flat estimates of
model (a) and (e) are biased because of the inclusion of lagged inflation (taken as
exogenous in our adaptive expectation versions) that is correlated with the errors,
and because models (b) and (f) correct for this bias.17
In all cases the estimated target variable implies equilibrium inflation rates of
around 4% or 5%. However, the energy shock coefficients in Table 4 are
contradictory, possibly due to the deficiency of our energy price indicator.
These results validate our conjecture that it will be difficult to distinguish
empirically between the models with inflation as a target and those with growth as
target. In Table 2 the highest likelihood is achieved by the elliptical growth target
objective with adaptive expectations, although the improvement over the circular
inflation target version is slight. In Figure 4 the generated elliptical growth target
tangency solutions (solid dots) display a pattern quite similar to those of the
circular inflation target solutions (open dots). The circular alternatives are restrictive
17 The rational expectations specification does not suffer from this particular form of endogeneity
bias, since it models expectations differently, as described above. However, the rational circular
inflation target models show a similar uncertainty concerning the Phillips curve slope, model
(d) estimates 2.72 with AR(1) errors, while the circular error version of the same model (not
reported) estimates 1.71. Although the rational expectations specification could plausibly
suffer from other forms of endogeneity bias, this would seem to be evidence against the
endogeneity bias explanation of this Phillips curve instability. Such bias remains a worry in the
rational model in the case that et, gt-1 or g*t are correlated with serially correlated errors. In any
case our autocorrelation specification should not suffer from endogeneity bias. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 136
because they impose the value judgment that inflation and growth are equally
important in determining policy, but there may be merit in this restriction. In the US
case the weighting parameter in model (c) is not significantly different from unity,
although for the OECD in model (g) it is. However, model (g) verges on instability
with rather extreme parameter estimates. Such instability is symptomatic of a model
that is barely identified; one of the elliptical models in Table 2 does not converge.
Divergence happens with the inflation weighting parameter l approaching
zero and the Phillips curve slope y approaching infinity. Model (g) illustrates this
tendency; its Phillips curve slope is unexpectedly steep, its inflation weight is
unexpectedly low. Thus, we find two types of specification uncertainty associated
with Phillips curve slope estimation, one due to serial correlation, and another
connected to target weighting.
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Textbook discussion often presents identification as an algebraic issue, logically
prior to estimation.18 Our results demonstrate that algebraic identification does
not guarantee stable parameter estimates.19 In light of the wide discussion of
inflation targeting and central bank independence, the inflation weight estimate of
0.31 in model (g) is suspiciously low. It is questionable whether policymakers
could have such a low weight.20 We prefer the circular inflation target version as
more intuitive and consistent with the literature. Any conclusions derived from
this specification needs to be qualified by the recognition of this restriction.
VII. Country heterogeneity
The OECD models above assume that all countries share the same target and
the same Phillips curve slope. Table 5 reports results that relax this assumption
by allowing different parameters for each of the 18 countries.21 The first and
second columns report likelihood statistics for fixed target effects in the
adaptive versions, with and without the autocorrelation correction. Again the
autocorrelation correction markedly increases the statistical fit. The third
and fourth columns impose an identical target, but allow 18 different Phillips
curve slopes, with and without the autocorrelation correction. The fifth column
18 The issue is algebraic for our parabolic specifications. Our parameter estimates (details
unreported) exactly satisfy (27).
19 Perhaps the generality of the elliptical model, using two parameters to define the objective
function, asks too much of these data. We investigate this idea by estimating a restricted
elliptical version with a zero inflation target. Although this restricted model uses only one
parameter to define the objective function (the same as the circular versions), it does not fit
the US data as well. The OECD estimate of the zero-target elliptical specification is divergent.
20 In a study of the relative importance of macroeconomic indicators to individual (rather
than government) utility, Welsch (2007) finds that inflation, unemployment and growth
rates are all important determinants of “life satisfaction.” He estimates roughly equal weights
for inflation and unemployment rates, less for the growth rate.
21 The political business cycle literature emphasizes that macroeconomic outcomes are also
determined by election cycles and central bank independence, which certainly differ among
countries. Both effects can be conceptualized as adding additional specification to the modeling
of our target. We neglect these effects here in order to focus on the functional form question.
Kiefer (2006) develops the political economy of the target along these lines and reports that
the central bank independence and political ideology (as measured by party platform
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imposes an identical target and slope, but allows different inflation shock
coefficients. The sixth column imposes identical target, slope and shock effects,
but allows different goal weights for the elliptical models. Overall, it appears that
the greatest source of heterogeneity is due to different Phillips curve slopes. The
seventh column combines different target and slope effects, but requires identical
energy shock effects and 1 = l .
Table 6 reports selected estimates of the country-varying parameters; all models
are circular except for model (l). Even though an elliptical form maximizes the
Model (i)  (j)  (k)  (l)  (n) 















Australia  5.80* 4.63* -1.12 0.65  5.78*  4.51* 
Austria  3.40* 3.44* -0.87 0.32*  3.41*  3.37* 
Belgium  3.85* 2.31* -0.96 0.26*  3.87*  2.28* 
Canada  4.00* 1.84* -2.43*  0.29*  4.10*  1.81* 
Denmark  5.99* 4.61*  0.31 0.55  6.05*  4.48* 
Finland  6.01* 2.11* -3.28*  0.31*  6.11*  2.04* 
France  5.17* 2.01* -3.43*  0.17*  5.21*  1.95* 
Germany 1.16  2.90  -0.67  0.52  1.18  2.78 
Ireland  7.03* 3.41* -3.43*  0.32*  7.02*  3.32* 
Italy  7.91* 1.80* -0.75 0.27*  7.95*  1.80* 
Japan 3.52*  1.84*  -1.46  0.29*  3.52*  1.77* 
Netherlands 3.73*  3.05*  -1.23  0.40*  3.73*  3.02* 
New  Zealand  6.43* 6.83*  0.21 0.42*  6.54*  6.76* 
Norway 4.64*  8.87  1.65  0.80  4.63*  8.63 
Sweden  5.57* 1.79* -2.18*  0.25*  5.62*  1.74* 
Switzerland  3.52* 1.84* -2.16*  0.21*  3.57*  1.82* 
UK 6.44*  2.57*  -1.01  0.19*  6.45*  2.50* 
US 3.61*  2.41*  -1.97  0.42*  3.63*  2.40* 
      R
2 (inflation)  0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68  0.67 
      R
2 (growth)  0.33 0.35 0.33 0.36  0.35 
System log likelihood  -3159 -3149 -3160 -3131  -3141 
Notes: 704 observations. The selected results are shaded in Table 5. * Statistically significant
at the 5% level; for the goal weight cases H0 : l = 1.
Table 6. Selected results with adaptive expectations and AR(1) errors: OECD
1958-1998





















likelihood, we prefer the circular form for the reasons argued above, theoretical
coherence and estimation stability. Several of the elliptical estimates diverge; and
the weights estimated in model (l) are unexpectedly low. Model (m) reports estimates
for a model with two types of heterogeneity; we hold the energy shock effects
constant because in model (k) they either have the wrong sign or are insignificant.
Allowing for heterogeneity in these ways does increase the goodness of fit as
compared to Table 3.
Figure 5 plots our estimates of the inflation targets from model (m) against
country-specific average inflation. The apparent positive tendency reflects the
time-consistent relation between targets and inflation. The differences between
the outlying results for Germany and Italy validate the conventional wisdom that
Germany has a strong preference for price stability, while Italy does not; the
correlation is 0.99. Country-specific estimates of the Phillips curve slopes do not
reveal any relation to inflation outcomes.
Figure 5. Inflation targets correlate with average inflaion, model (m) JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 142
VIII. Conclusion
We develop a model of political and economic interaction, and test its relevance to
the macroeconomic history of the US and OECD countries. Although our results
exhibit considerable uncertainty, some conclusions emerge. One of these is that
the endogenous stabilization hypothesis contributes to our understanding of
aggregate outcomes. Our political business cycle models are statistically superior
to a more agnostic alternative, as long as we invoke an adaptive theory of
expectations, rather than the more conventional rational theory. Even with a careful
modeling the strongly rational model of expectations does not improve on a naive
benchmark, except when an autocorrelation correction is added. Mixed conclusions
emerge from our statistical comparison of alternative preference forms. Although
it is hard to distinguish between circular and elliptical indifference curves, or between
growth and inflation targets, the quadratic form is more likely than the parabolic
one, and inflation (or growth) goals are more likely than level goals.
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